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Abstract— We consider the critical problem of distributed
learning over data while keeping it private from the computa-
tional servers. The state-of-the-art approaches to this problem
rely on quantizing the data into a finite field, so that the cryp-
tographic approaches for secure multiparty computing can then
be employed. These approaches, however, can result in substantial
accuracy losses due to fixed-point representation of the data and
computation overflows. To address these critical issues, we propose
a novel algorithm to solve the problem when data is in the analog
domain, e.g., the field of real/complex numbers. We characterize
the privacy of the data from both information-theoretic and cryp-
tographic perspectives, while establishing a connection between
the two notions in the analog domain. More specifically, the well-
known connection between the distinguishing security (DS) and
the mutual information security (MIS) metrics is extended from
the discrete domain to the continues domain. This is then utilized
to bound the amount of information about the data leaked to
the servers in our protocol, in terms of the DS metric, using
well-known results on the capacity of single-input multiple-output
(SIMO) channel with correlated noise. It is shown how the pro-
posed framework can be adopted to do computation tasks when
data is represented using floating-point numbers. We then show
that this leads to a fundamental trade-off between the privacy
level of data and accuracy of the result. As an application, we also
show how to train a machine learning model while keeping the
data as well as the trained model private. Then numerical results
are shown for experiments on the MNIST dataset. Furthermore,
experimental advantages are shown comparing to fixed-point im-
plementations over finite fields.
Index Terms— Analog secret sharing, privacy-preserving com-
puting, distributed learning.
I. INTRODUCTION
It is estimated that 2.5 ˆ 1018 bytes of data are generated
every day with a pace that is only accelerating as 90 percent of
the data in the world has been generated in the past two years.
Datasets with massive size need to be processed at an unprece-
dented scale, which makes it imperative to provide scalable
solutions for large computational jobs associated with learning
problems to be performed in a distributed fashion [1]. In such
distributed systems, data is dispersed among many servers that
operate in parallel with the aim of collectively completing a
certain computational job, e.g., computing a certain function
over the dataset. Then the results generated by sufficiently
many local servers are collected in order to recover the desired
outcome, e.g., the output of the given function over the dataset.
One of the major concerns in such distributed learning sys-
tems is to preserve the privacy of the dataset while dispersing
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it among the servers. More specifically, the dataset may contain
highly sensitive information, e.g., biometric data of patients in a
hospital [2] or customers’ data of a company [3], necessitating
that almost no information about the dataset is revealed to
the computational servers. Such a privacy constraint is often
generalized to ensure that any subset of colluding servers, up
to a certain size, can not gain almost any information about the
dataset.
The privacy of data can be measured in terms of various
metrics, including information-theoretic security [4] as well
as well-known notions of semantic security and distinguishing
security in the cryptography literature emanating from [5].
Fundamental connections between these notions are established
in [6]. The seminal Shamir’s secret sharing scheme and its
various versions are often used to provide information-theoretic
security for data, referred to as a secret, while distributing it
among a set of servers/users [7]. Also, Shamir’s scheme serves
as the backbone of most of the existing schemes on privacy-
preserving distributed computing such as the celebrated BGW
scheme [8]. The idea can be illustrated via an example as
follows. Consider a given dataset X and two computational
servers, referred to as servers 1 and 2. Suppose that the function
f pXq “ aX, where a is a scaler, needs to be computed
over the dataset X. The data symbols in X as well as a are
considered as elements of a finite field Fq. Then a random N
is generated, with the same size as the dataset X and entries
generated independently and uniformly at random from Fq.
Then N and X ` N, also referred to as secret shares, are given
to the servers 1 and 2, respectively. Since N and X`N are both
uniformly distributed, the servers do not learn anything about X
individually. The servers return aN and apX` Nq. Then aX is
recovered by subtracting the former from the latter.
In Shamir’s scheme, the secret/data symbols are always
assumed to be elements of a finite field. Consequently, the state-
of-the-art schemes treat the data symbols in the given dataset as
finite field elements in order to employ Shamir’s secret sharing,
see, e.g., [8]. However, quantizing the data into a finite field can
result in substantial accuracy losses mainly due to computation
overflows. In practice, the dataset X consists of real/complex
values often represented as floating-point numbers. Then X can
not be perfectly secured in an information-theoretic sense, i.e.,
the mutual information between X and X ` N, denoted by
IpX;X`Nq, being exactly zero. These are the main challenges
that need to be properly addressed when designing privacy-
preserving distributed learning algorithms in the infinite fields
of R{C, also referred to as the analog domain.
A. Our contributions
In this paper, we provide a framework to construct the
counterpart of Shamir’s secret sharing scheme in the analog
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2domain. This framework is then used to construct privacy-
preserving distributed computation and learning protocols over
real/complex datasets. In other words, all the operations in-
cluding encoding the data symbols to be distributed among the
computational servers and recovery of the final outcome from
the collected results returned by the servers are over the infinite
fields of R{C. It is assumed that the servers are honest-but-
curious meaning that they will not deviate from the protocol
but may attempt to infer the data from what they observe
throughout the protocol.
In the proposed protocol, the information-theoretic measure
of security is no longer perfect, comparing to Shamir’s secret
sharing scheme over finite fields, as discussed earlier. In order
to show the privacy guarantees of the protocol, bounds are
provided on how much information about data is revealed to a
server/subsets of servers in terms of various notions of security.
We also argue that, in a practical setting, this comes at the ex-
pense of accuracy of the final outcome of the protocol when all
data symbols are represented by floating-point numbers and all
operations are also assumed to follow standard floating-point
operations. More precisely, we provide a fundamental trade-
off between the security level of the protocol and the accuracy
of the outcome in a practical setting assuming floating-point
operations. The proposed protocol is also used in a distributed
learning experiment using four servers to train a logistic re-
gression model over MNIST dataset [9]. In this experiment, the
amount of information about the dataset and the trained model
revealed to each of the servers, in terms of the distinguishing
security metric, is less than 10´15 and 2ˆ 10´14, respectively.
It is observed that the accuracy of our protocol closely follows
that of the conventional centralized approach, thereby offering
a privacy-preserving distributed solution at a negligible cost in
terms of the accuracy of the result. Furthermore, it is shown
that while approaches based on fixed-point implementations
suffer from a sharp transition to the performance of randomly
guessing by increasing the size of training dataset, our protocol
offers a robust solution that is scalable with the size of the
training dataset.
B. Related work
Studying privacy-preserving distributed machine learning
algorithms has recently received significant attention in the
literature [10]–[15]. There is also an extensive amount of
work on secure matrix-matrix multiplication which is a core
building block for many machine learning algorithms, see,
e.g., [16]–[20]. As mentioned earlier, the information-theoretic
privacy guarantees of the data in these prior works is based
upon Shamir’s secret sharing scheme and its variations. Since
Shamir’s scheme needs to be run over a finite field while data
symbols are real-valued, a common method is to assume a
certain quantization of the data symbols followed by mapping
them into elements of a finite field of a large prime size.
However, if an overflow occurs, i.e., a computed symbol during
the computation process by one of the servers becomes larger
than the field size, then a successful recovery of the outcome
of the computation can not be guaranteed. In other words, the
computation procedure at each of the servers can be regarded as
a fixed point computation, which is constrained by conditions
guaranteeing no overflow occurs.
There is also another line of work on adopting coded dis-
tributed computing protocols for computation over real-valued
data [21]–[24]. But these works are mostly focused on the
numerical stability of the protocols in the presence of slow or
unresponsive servers, also referred to as stragglers, and do not
study privacy guarantees for the data. Our focus in this paper is
on providing privacy-preserving protocols and straggler servers
are not considered. Also, codes in the analog domain have been
recently studied in the context of block codes [25] as well as
subspace codes [26] for analog error correction. However, se-
cret sharing and privacy-preserving computation in the analog
domain are not discussed in these works.
Another related major line of work concerns with floating-
point implementation of secure multi-party computing (MPC)
protocols [27]–[29]. Such protocols can be described in high
level as follows. In a standard floating-point implementation,
each number/data symbol is represented by two main com-
ponents: one represents the most, let’s say v, significant bits
of the data symbol and the other one represents the power of
the exponent of data symbol. Then these two components of
the data symbols are secured separately using Shamir’s secret
sharing over finite fields. This requires a certain implementation
of floating-point operations and does not allow using off-the-
shelf readily available floating-point operations that are often
optimized to perform computational tasks on badges of data in
parallel. As a result, the inefficiency of such protocols poses a
major difficulty in their implementation. Furthermore, a major
difference between this line of work and our approach is that
the parties are allowed to communicate in secure multiparty
computing. This is mainly because in this setting each party
aims at computing a certain function of data symbols shared
between the parties without revealing any information about
his/her share of the data. The communication overhead between
the parties/servers is another major factor contributing to the
inefficiency of these protocols in practical systems. On the other
hand, in our approach, different servers are assumed to run
in parallel and no communication is required between them.
Once finished, the servers return their locally computed results
from which the true outcome of the computational task can be
computed.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The problem is
formulated in Section II followed by the description of the pro-
posed protocol. The accuracy of the the protocol is analyzed in
Section III. In Section IV we provide an analysis for the privacy
level of data in the protocol by considering two well-known
notions of security. Various experimental results are provided
in Section V. Finally, the paper is concluded in Section VI.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION AND THE PROTOCOL
Consider a setup with N computation servers/parties indexed
by 1, 2, . . . ,N. Given a data symbol s, also referred to as a
secret, a D-degree polynomial function of s denoted by f psq
needs to be computed by utilizing the computational power of
the parties, while the secret remains private assuming up to t
parties can collude. The notion of privacy will be clarified in
3Section IV. The secret s is an instance of a continuous random
variable S taking values in r´r, rs. 1 Other than this constraint
on the range of S, no assumption is made on the probability
distribution of S.
Remark 1. Note that the computational task of polynomial
evaluation is considered in this paper in order to arrive at
explicit analytical guarantees. However, in order to apply this
setup to a learning experiment, a polynomial approximation of
the underlying computation function, e.g., the sigmoid function,
can be considered. This will be further discussed in Section V.
In the considered protocol, given the secret s the polynomial
ppxq is constructed as follows:
ppxq def“ s`
tÿ
j“1
njxj,
where nj’s are i.i.d., drawn from a zero-mean circular sym-
metric complex Gaussian distribution with standard deviation
σn?
t
, denoted by N p0, σ2nt q, where t is the maximum number of
colluding parties. For evaluating the precision of the protocol
in practice, the distribution of ni’s will be truncated, i.e., it
is assumed that they are drawn from a truncated Gaussian
distribution with a maximum absolute value, denoted by m, for
m P R`. This will be further clarified in Section III. The shares
of the computation parties consist of the evaluation of ppxq over
certain complex-valued evaluation points ω1, . . . ,ωt, i.e.,
yi “ s`
tÿ
j“1
ω
j
inj (1)
is given to server i, for i P rNs. In the next section, it is shown
how to pick ωi’s in order to maximize the accuracy. The system
of equations in (1) can be written in the matrix form as follows:
yNˆ1 “ ANˆpt`1qxpt`1qˆ1, (2)
where x “ ps, n1, . . . , ntqT, y “ py1, . . . , yNqT, and
A def“
»———–
1 ω1 . . . ωt1
1 ω2 . . . ωt2
...
...
. . .
...
1 ωN . . . ωtN
fiffiffiffifl .
Then server i computes f pyiq and returns the result, e.g., to a
master node. The master node then recovers f psq. Conceptu-
ally, this can be done by interpolating the polynomial f
`
ppxq˘
and evaluating it at 0, i.e., the constant coefficient of f
`
ppxq˘ is
equal to f psq. More specifically, let a “ p f psq, a1, . . . , adqT,
where d “ Dt, denote the vector of all coefficients of the
polynomial f pppxqq. Let also z “ p f py1q, . . . , f pyNqqT and
B def“
»———–
1 ω1 . . . ωd1
1 ω2 . . . ωd2
...
...
. . .
...
1 ωN . . . ωdN
fiffiffiffifl .
1Following the convention, random variables are represented by capital
letters and their instances are represented by lower case letters.
Then the system of linear equations
zNˆ1 “ BNˆpd`1qa1ˆpd`1q, (3)
can be solved for a in order to recover f psq. Note that N ě
Dt ` 1 “ d ` 1 is the necessary and sufficient condition
on the number of parties in order to guarantee a successful
interpolation of f
`
ppxq˘, which is of degree d. Equivalently, it
is the necessary and sufficient condition for recovery of a in (3).
Throughout the rest of this paper, it is assumed that N “ d` 1,
implying that all shares yi’s are needed to be returned to the
master node for a successful recovery of the computation
Note that the master node does not need to compute the entire
a in (3) and is only interested in recovering f psq, the first entry
of a. Let b˜ denote the first row of B´1, which is well-defined
due to B being a Vandermonde matrix. Then the master node
only needs to compute b˜z to recover f psq. Since ωi’s are fixed,
b˜ is computed once, is stored, and then is used every time the
protocol is run.
Remark 2. Note that the computation complexity of encoding
in the master node is linear with the dataset size, where the
dataset is treated as a vector of secrets and f p.q needs to be eval-
uated over the entries of this vector. Moreover, the complexity
of decoding is also linear with the dataset size as the decoder
only computes a linear combination of the results returned by
the servers. In other words, the computation complexity at the
master node does not depend on D, which can be large. It
is worth mentioning that the goal of the protocol is not to
reduce the overall computation complexity of a computation
task across all the servers. The protocol in this paper, as well as
prior works in the literature, e.g., [14], provide a framework to
utilize external computation units in distributed servers while
providing privacy guarantees.
To summarize, the protocol is described step-by-step in Al-
gorithm 1 next.
Algorithm 1 Privacy-preserving distributed polynomial evalu-
ation scheme in the analog domain.
Input: Secret s.
Public parameters: ANˆpt`1q, b˜1ˆN .
Output: Evaluation of f psq in the master node.
Encoding phase (at the master):
Pick i.i.d. nj „ N p0, σ
2
n
t q, for j “ 1, . . . , t.
Set x “ ps, n1, . . . , ntqT.
Compute py1, . . . , yNqT “ Ax.
Send yi to server i.
Computation phase (at server i):
Compute zi “ f pyiq.
Send zi the to the master node.
Decoding phase (at the master):
Set z “ pz1, . . . , zNqT.
Compute f psq “ b˜z.
In the next section, the accuracy of the protocol described in
Algorithm 1 is analyzed. In theory, if all the computations are
done over the complex numbers with infinite precision, then
f psq is computed accurately. In practice, data is represented us-
ing a finite number of bits, either as fixed point or floating point.
4Floating-point representation consists of a fixed-precision part
and an exponent part specifying how the fixed-precision part is
scaled. Let v denote the number of precision bits in the floating-
point representation, i.e., the v most significant bits are kept in
the fixed-precision part. Let also q denote the number of bits
used to represent the power of the exponent part in the floating-
point representation.
III. ACCURACY ANALYSIS
In this section, accuracy of the computation outcome of
the proposed protocol in Section II is characterized in terms
of other parameters of the protocol. Furthermore, it is shown
how to pick the evaluation points in the protocol in order to
maximize the accuracy.
In general, in a system of linear equations Ax “ y, where
x is the vector of unknown variables, the perturbation in the
solution caused by the perturbation in y is characterized as
follows. Let yˆ denote a noisy version of y, where the noise
can be caused by round-off errors, truncation, etc. Let also xˆ
denote the solution to the considered linear system when y
is replaced by yˆ. Let ∆xdef“ xˆ ´ x and ∆ydef“ yˆ ´ y denote the
perturbation, also referred to as error, in x and y, respectively.
Then the relative perturbations of x is bounded in terms of that
of y as follows [30]:
‖∆x‖
‖x‖ ď κA
‖∆y‖
‖y‖ , (4)
where κA is the condition number of A.
As mentioned in Section II, the Gaussian distribution of ni’s
is truncated in practice. This is used to provide a deterministic
(non-probabilistic) guarantee on the accuracy of the computa-
tion result expressed in the following theorem.
Theorem 1: Let ∆ f psq denote the perturbation of f psq in
the protocol discussed in Section II and aD denote the leading
coefficient of f pxq. Let r ď m. Then,
∆ f psq ď aD
?
t` 1mDκA2´pv`1q, (5)
where t is the maximum number of colluding parties, m is
the truncation parameter of the Gaussian distribution, κA is the
condition number ofA given in (2), v is the number of precision
bits, and r is the bound on the absolute value of the secret. In
particular, by setting ωi “ exp p 2pi jiN q for i P rNs, we have
∆ f psq ď aD
?
t` 1mD2´pv`1q.
Proof: In order to recover f psq, the system of equations
f pppωiqq “ yi, for i P rNs, is solved once all yi’s are returned.
This can be considered as a system of linear equations Ax “
y, as described in (2). Observe that ∆s ď ‖∆x‖ and ‖x‖ ď
aD
?
t` 1mD. Hence, (4) implies that
∆ f psq
aD
?
t` 1mD ď
‖∆x‖
‖x‖ . (6)
Moreover, since v is the number of precision bits, we have
‖∆y‖
‖y‖ ď 2
´pv`1q. (7)
Combining (6) with (7) yields
∆ f psq ď aD
?
t` 1mDκA2´pv`1q. (8)
In particular, if the evaluation points are the N-th roots of unity,
i.e., ωi “ exp p 2pi jiN q, the matrix A turns into a unitary matrix
for which κA “ 1. Hence,
∆ f psq ď aD
?
t` 1mD2´pv`1q. (9)
Remark 3. Roughly speaking, picking the evaluation points as
the roots of unity in the complex plane is optimal from the
accuracy point of view. This is because this particular choice
results in the minimum possible condition number κA and,
consequently, minimizes the bound on the computation error
provided in Theorem 1. Throughout the rest of this paper we
assume that the evaluation points are the N-th roots of unity.
IV. PRIVACY ANALYSIS
In this section, we provide an analysis for the privacy level
of data/secret in the proposed distributed computing protocol
by considering two well-known notions of security, namely,
mutual information security (MIS) and distinguishing security
(DS). More specifically, we first consider these metrics of
security assuming t “ 1, i.e., there is no collusion between
the computation parties, in Section IV-A. Characterizing the
privacy in the presence of t colluding parties when t ą 1 is
studied in Section IV-B. In these two sections it is assumed that
the Gaussian distribution of noise terms nj’s is not truncated,
i.e., m “ 8. Then, in Section IV-C, the results on the privacy of
data are extended to cases with truncated Gaussian distribution
for the noise terms.
A. Privacy against a single party
Consider the computational party i for i P t1, 2, . . . ,Nu.
Then the amount of information revealed to party i about the
secret s can be measured in terms of the MIS metric, denoted
by ηc, and defined as
ηc
def“ max
i
max
PS :|S|ăr
IpS;Yiq, (10)
where PS is the probability density function (PDF) of S. DS
metric, denoted by ηs, is another metric for security which is
defined using the total variation (TV) distance metric DTVp., .q.
In general, for any two probability measures P1 and P2 on
a σ-algebra F , DTVpP1, P2q is defined as supAPF |P1pAq ´
P2pAq|. While DS metric is often defined for discrete random
variables in the cryptography literature, it can be extended to
real-valued random variables as follows:
ηs
def“ max
i
max
s1,s2PDS
DTVpPYi|S“s1 , PYi|S“s2q, (11)
where DS is the support of S. Note that both metrics ηc and
ηs are non-negative. Also, roughly speaking, the smaller these
metrics are the more private the secret s is.
Upper bounding the security metric ηc is discussed next.
Since |S| ă r, as discussed in Section II, we have ErS2s ď r2.
This together with (10) imply that
ηc “ max
PS :|S|ăr
IpS;Yiq ď max
PS :ErS2sďr2
IpS;Yiq
“ log2p1`
r2
σ2n
q,
(12)
5where the last equality is by the well-known result on the
capacity of the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) channel
[31]. Since the noise variance σ2n can be picked arbitrarily large,
one can assume r “ opσnq to simplify the inequality in (12) as
follows:
ηc ď 1ln 2
r2
σ2n
` o`p r
σn
˘2q. (13)
The notion of Hellinger distance, denoted by Hp., .q, is useful
to bound the DS metric. It is defined as follows:
HpP1, P2q def“ 12
ż
paP1 ´aP2q2dψ. (14)
The Hellinger distance can be bounded in terms of the total
variation distance as follows [32]:
HpP1, P2q2 ď DTVpP1, P2q ď
?
2HpP1, P2q. (15)
Let P1 and P2 be the PDFs of two complex Gaussian distribu-
tions both with variance σ2and means µ1 and µ2, respectively.
Also assume that the real and imaginary parts are independent
and have identical variances. Then we have [33]
HpP1, P2q “
c
1´ expp´pµ1 ´ µ2q
2
4σ2
q. (16)
Using the aforementioned relations, the privacy parameter ηs is
bounded in the following theorem.
Theorem 2: The DS metric ηs is bounded as follows:
ηs ď
d
2p1´ expp´ r
2
σ2n
qq,
where r is the maximum absolute value of the secret s and σ2n
is the variance of the noise used in the proposed protocol. In
particular, when r “ opσnq we have
ηs ď
?
2
r
σn
` op r
σn
q.
Proof: Note that the conditional distribution of Yi given
S “ si, specified in (11), is N p´si, σ2nq. Then by using (11)
together with (15) and (16) we have
ηs ď
d
2p1´ expp´ r
2
σ2n
qq. (17)
In particular, for r “ opσnq, (17) is simplified to
ηs ď
?
2
r
σn
` op r
σn
q. (18)
Next, we discuss the relation between the two considered
security metrics in the analog domain. It is known that the MIS
and DS metrics can be directly related to each other over the
space of discrete random variables [6]. In particular, it is shown
that [6]:
ηs ď
a
2ηc, (19)
assuming all the underlying random variables are discrete. We
show in the next lemma that this result can be extended to the
analog domain.
Lemma 3: The inequality in (19) also holds when the under-
lying random variables, i.e., the secret as well as observations
by parties, are continuous random variables.
Proof: Let X and Y denote two continuous random
variables and X∆ and Y∆ denote their quantized versions,
respectively. Then we have [31]
IpX,Yq “ lim
∆Ñ0 IpX
∆;Y∆q.
It can be observed that the same is true for the total variation
distance, i.e., DTVpX,Yq “ lim∆Ñ0 DTVpX∆;Y∆q. Hence,
(19) still holds assuming all the underlying random variables
are continuous.
Lemma 3 is used to bound ηs later in Section IV-B. Note that
one could apply it to derive a bound on ηs using the bound
on ηc in (12). However, the resulting bound would be weaker
comparing to the result stated in Theorem 2.
Note that the amount of information revealed to a compu-
tational party, in terms of either of the security metrics, is a
decreasing function of rσn . Furthermore, these metrics approach
zero, i.e., the case with the perfect privacy (ηn, ηc “ 0), as
σn ÝÑ 8. Hence, increasing the noise variance improves the
privacy of the scheme, However, this comes at the expense of
reducing the precision of the result. This motivates studying
the trade-off between the security metrics, as measures of data
privacy, and the precision of the computations given a fixed
number of bits to represent the floating-point numbers. This is
the focus of Section IV-C. In the next section, the results of this
section are extended to the case with colluding parties.
B. Privacy against colluding parties
Let t denote the number of colluding parties. The aim is to
ensure the privacy of data against any subset of t colluding
computational parties. To this end, an upper bound on the
amount of information revealed about the data/secret to the
colluding parties is derived. Let A “ ti1, . . . , itu denote the
set of indices for the colluding parties. Then the MIS metric is
the mutual information between S and all shares Yi’s for i P A,
in the worst case, i.e.,
ηc “ max
A
IpS;Yi1 , . . . ,Yitq. (20)
Next it is shown that this can be upper bounded using the known
results on the capacity of a single-input multiple-output (SIMO)
channel under power constraints [34], similar to how the upper
bound in (12) is obtained using the capacity result of AWGN
channel. Let h and N denote the channel coefficient vector
and noise correlation matrix of a SIMO channel with t output
antennas, respectively. Then the capacity is given by [34]
C “ log2p1` p ‖h‖2 νq, (21)
where p is the power of transmitted signal and ν is the max-
imum eigenvalue of N´1. Consider a SIMO channel with
htˆ1 “ 1def“p1, . . . , 1qT and the correlated noise terms of
n˜i
def“ řtj“1 ω jinj. Then the secret s is mapped to the input of
this channel. It can be observed that the shares given to t servers
can be mapped to the received symbols in this SIMO channel.
Then the average input power is bounded by r2, where r is the
maximum absolute value of s. Consequently, the capacity of the
aforementioned SIMO channel with input power r2 is an upper
bound on the amount of information revealed to the t colluding
6parties. Note that the coefficients ωi’s are the N-th roots of the
unity, as discussed in Section III. Then it can be observed that
Ern˜jn˜k˚s “ ´ σ
2
n
t , for j ‰ k, and Ern˜jn˜j˚s “ σ2n . Then, similar
to (12), one can write
ηc ď log2p1`
r2
σ2n
tν˜q, (22)
where ν˜ is the maximum eigenvalue of N˜´1, where N˜ “
t`1
t Itˆt ´ 1t 11t. Note that N˜ has t ´ 1 eigenvalues equal to
t`1
t and the last one is equal to
1
t . This implies that ν˜ “ t.
Substituting this in (22) yields:
ηc ď log2p1`
r2t2
σ2n
q, (23)
providing an upper bound on the amount of information re-
vealed to t colluding parties in terms the MIS metric ηc. In
particular, for r “ opσnq we have
ηc ď t
2
ln 2
r2
σ2n
` op r
2
σ2n
q. (24)
Note that (24) is reduced to (13) for t “ 1.
Let ηs denote DS metric for this case. By Lemma 3 together
with (23) we have
ηs ď
d
2 log2p1` t2
r2
σ2n
q. (25)
In particular, for r “ opσnq
ηs ď
c
2
ln 2
t
r
σn
` op r
σn
q. (26)
C. Privacy results with truncated noise
The results provided on the security metrics so far are derived
by assuming the additive noise terms nj’s are drawn from a
Gaussian distribution. While this assumption is valid in theory,
such terms need to be truncated in practice as they can not be
arbitrarily large. Furthermore, as shown in Section III, in order
to provide guarantees on the accuracy of the computations, nj’s
need to be bounded, i.e., |nj| ď m for some m P R`. In this
section, we extend the results on bounding the security metrics
in the proposed protocol to the case where nj’s are drawn
from a truncated Gaussian probability distribution. To simplify
the computation, it is assumed that the truncation threshold is
m “ α σn?
t
, where α P R` and σn?
t
is the standard deviation of
the Gaussian distribution.
First, the effect of truncation on the total variation distance
metric is analyzed in the general case with t colluding parties.
In particular, we show that the change in the DS metric is
exponentially small in terms of α. Let η1s denote the DS metric
after truncation of noise terms. Let Ω denote a t-dimensional
complex vector space associated with pyi1 , . . . , yitq, where
yij ’s are defined in (1). Let PYt and QYt denote the PDFs of
Yt
def“pYi1 , . . . ,Yitq given s “ r and s “ ´r, respectively,
when the noise terms are not truncated. Similarly, P˜Yt and
Q˜Yt are defined when the noise terms are truncated. Also, Let
B1 “ tyt P Ω : P˜Ytpytq ‰ 0u, B2 “ tyt P Ω : Q˜Ytpytq ‰ 0u
and B12 “ B1 X B2.
Note that P˜Ytpytq “ 1wPYtpytq and Q˜Ytpytq “ 1wQYtpytq,
for yt P B1 and yt P B2, respectively, and are zero otherwise,
where w is given by
w “ Prrp|n1| ă m, . . . , |nt| ă mqs (27)
“ Prr|n1| ă mst ě p1´ 2 expp´α
2
2
qqt, (28)
where the inequality is by bounding the tail distribution func-
tion of the standard normal distribution. One can observe that
the TV distance in (11) is maximized when s1 “ r and s2 “
´r. Then, using an alternative definition of the total variation
distance when the probability measures are over R we can
write:
η1s “ 12
ż
Ω
|P˜Ytpytq ´ Q˜Ytpytq|dyt (29)
“ 1
2
ż
B12
|P˜Ytpytq ´ Q˜Ytpytq|dyt (30)
` 1
2
ż
Bc12
|P˜Ytpytq ´ Q˜Ytpytq|dyt. (31)
The term in (30) is bounded as follows:ż
B12
|P˜Ytpytq ´ Q˜Ytpytq|dyt “
1
w
ż
B12
|PYtpytq ´QYtpytq|dyt
(32)
ď 1
w
ż
Ω
|PYtpytq ´QYtpytq|dyt “
1
w
ηs, (33)
where (33) is by noting that B12 Ă Ω. In order to derive an
upper bound on the term in (31) note thatż
Bc12
|P˜Ytpytq ´ Q˜Ytpytq|dyt (34)
ď
ż
Bc12
P˜Ytpytqdyt `
ż
Bc12
Q˜Ytpytqdyt (35)
“ 2
ż
Bc12
P˜Ytpytqdyt, (36)
where (36) is due to symmetry. An upper bound on the term in
(36) is derived in the following lemma.
Lemma 4: We haveż
Bc12
P˜Ytpytq ď p2 expp´
1
2
pα´ 2r
?
t
σn
q2qqt.
Proof: Let P1Yt denote the PDF of the random vector Yt
given s “ r and assuming ni’s are drawn from a truncated
Gaussian distribution with threshold m ´ 2r. Similar to the
definition of B1, let B11
def“tyt P Ω : p1Ytpytq ‰ 0u. Since the
equations relating yi’s and ni’s in (1) are linear, then it can be
observed that B11 Ă B12. Then we haveż
Bc12
P˜Ytpytqdyt ď
ż
Bc12
1
w
PYtpytqdyt (37)
ď
ż
B11
c
PYtpytqdyt ď p2 expp´
1
2
pα´ 2r
?
t
σn
q2qqt (38)
where (37) holds because P˜Ytpytq is either equal to 1wPYtpytq
or zero, the first inequality in (38) holds since B11 Ă B12
implies Bc12 Ă B11c, and the second one is by bounding the tail
7log10pσnq 5 11 18
log10p∆ f psqq ´9.80 ´4.80 0.196
log10pηsq ´2.36 ´7.35 ´12.4
TABLE I: Demonstration of the trade-off between DS security metric
and accuracy. The upper bound on ηs in (23) is calculted versus the up-
per bound on ∆ f psq obtained in Theorem 1 by at σn “ 105, 1010, 1018.
Other parameters are aD “ 1, t “ 1, D “ 1, α “ 10, r “ 255 and
v “ 52.
distribution function of the standard normal distribution
Theorem 5: The DS metric for the case where nj’s are drawn
from a truncated Gaussian distribution with truncation level
α σn?
t
satisfies the following inequality:
η1s ď 1wηs `
1
w
p2 expp´1
2
pα´ 2r
?
t
σn
q2qqt,
where w ě p1´ 2 expp´ α22 qqt.
Proof: The proof follows by (29) together with bounding
(30) using (33) and (31) using the result of Lemma 4, respec-
tively.
Theorem 5 implies that picking, for instance, α “ 10 with
t “ 10, and already having a very small rσn is sufficient to obtain
almost the same bound on the DS metric as in the case where
the noise terms are not truncated. Hence, truncation of the noise
terms in (1) does not compromise the privacy of data in the
protocol as long as α is picked sufficiently large.
In order to obtain a similar result for the MIS metric, a result
on the capacity of channels with additive truncated Gaussian
noise is needed. This problem is studied recently, see, e.g., [35].
In particular, it is shown that the capacity of AWGN channel is
robust against truncation of the noise. More specifically, it is
shown that the change in the capacity by truncating the noise
is Opexpp´ α22 qq [35]. Hence, the MIS metric is increased by at
most Opexpp´ α22 qq when truncating the noise, mimicking the
result derived for the DS metric in Theorem 5
In Table I, the trade-off between the privacy and the accuracy
of our protocol is demonstrated using the theoretical results
obtained in Section III and Section IV. It can be observed that
increasing the variance of the noise σn improves the privacy but
at the same time reduced the accuracy of the computations.
V. EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we demonstrate experiment results on the
performance of our proposed protocol when applied to a certain
learning algorithm. First, it is shown that the accuracy of the
results obtained by using our protocol in a distributed setting
closely follows that of a conventional centralized approach,
thereby providing almost the same accuracy as in the cen-
tralized approach. Second, the performance of our protocol is
compared with that of the state-of-the-art schemes employing
fixed-point numbers by quantizing the data and mapping it to
finite field elements. In particular, we compare our protocol
with CodedPrivateML [14] in terms of accuracy and run time.
The problem of training a logistic regression (LR) model
over MNIST dataset is considered. Let X P Rmˆd denote a
dataset consisting of m samples with d features and l P t0, 1um
denote the corresponding label vector. The task is to compute
the model parameters (weights)w P Rd by iteratively minimiz-
ing the cross entropy function using the following parameter
update equation:
wpj`1q “ wpjq ´ β
m
XTpgpXwpjqq ´ lqq, (39)
where w is the estimated parameters in iteration i, β is the
learning rate, and gpxqdef“ 11`expp´xq is the sigmoid function
that operates element-wise over the vector inputs. For each data
point xi P R1ˆd, the estimated probability of li being equal to 1
is gpxiwq. All experiments are performed in MATLAB and the
considered problem is the binary classification between digits
3 and 7 over MNIST dataset. Our protocol for the distributed
training of the LR model is inspired by Algorithm 1 and is
described in Algorithm 2. This protocol is implemented using
the default double-precision floating-point (FLP) representation
in MATLAB with 64 bits, where v “ 52, q “ 11, and the other
bit is reserved for the sign.
Algorithm 2 Privacy-preserving distributed training of logistic
regression model in the analog domain.
Input: Dataset X P Rmˆd, the number of iterations k and α.
Public parameters: pω1, . . . ,ωNq, b˜1ˆN “ pb˜1, . . . , b˜Nq.
Output: Parameter vector w for the logistic regression model.
Encoding dataset (at the master):
Pick i.i.d. Nj P Rmˆd with entries independently drawn from
N p0, σ2nt q truncated at α σn?t , for j “ 1, . . . , t.
for i P rNs do
Compute X˜i “ X `
řt
j“1 ω
j
iNj.
end
Send X˜i to server i.
Computation of w iteratively:
Set wp0q “ 0.
for j P t0, . . . , k´ 1u do
Encoding phase (at the master):
Pick i.i.d. nj P R1ˆd with entries independently drawn
from N p0, σ2nt q truncated at α σn?t , for j “ 1, . . . , t.
Compute w˜pjqi “ wpjq `
řt
h“1 ωhi nh.
Send w˜pjqi to server i.
Computation phase (at server i):
Compute zi “ X˜Ti X˜iw˜pjqi .
Send zi to the master node.
Decoding phase (at the master):
Compute upjq “ řNi“1 b˜izi.
Update wpj`1q “ wpjq ´ β2m r 12upjq `XTp1´ 2lqs.
end
Return w “ wpkq.
Next, we describe the steps in Algorithm 2 in details. In the
beginning, the data matrix X is encoded element-wise using the
analog counterpart of Shamir’s encoder, same as in (1), and then
the secret shares are sent to the servers. Let X˜i denote the share
sent to server i, for i P rNs. The initial parameter vector is set to
the all-zero vector, i.e., wp0q “ 0. Let k denote the total number
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Fig. 1: Comparison of the codes in G2,npRq obtained from CP codes
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Fig. 1: Comparison between the accuracy of our distributed learning
protocol and the conventional centralized logistic regression (LR).
of iterations for updating the model parameters using (39) in
the experiment. In the j-th iteration, for j P t0, . . . , k´ 1u, the
master node encodes wpjq element-wise, again same as in (1),
and sends the shares to the servers. Let w˜pjqi denote the share
of wpjq sent to server i. The server i then computes X˜Ti X˜iw˜
pjq
i
and returns the result to the master node. Next, the master node
recovers XTi Xiw
pjq
i by computing a linear combination of the
returned results, same as in the decoding phase in Algorithm 1,
and utilizes it to update the vector of parameters according
to (39) with the sigmoid function substituted by its 1-degree
polynomial approximation, i.e., gpxq « 12 ` x4 . This procedure
is continued till the desired number of iterations is passed and
the last update of the parameter vector is returned as the final
result of the protocol. It is worth mentioning that the data
matrix X is secret-shared only once at the beginning and the
same shares are used at each iteration by the servers while
the parameter vector w is updated and secret-shared in each
iteration.
The vector of model parameters w for the training dataset is
computed using Algorithm 2 as well as using the conventional
centralized method. The number of servers N “ 4 and t “ 1
are assumed. Note that in the centralized method the sigmoid
function is not approximated while in our implementation it is
approximated with a degree-1 polynomial. Then the accuracy
of the predictions are determined over the MNIST test dataset
in both approaches. The result is shown in Figure 1. It can be
observed that the accuracy of our protocol closely follows that
of the conventional centralized approach.
It this setting with honest-but-curious servers, as mentioned
in Section I-A, the servers may attempt to infer the data by
accumulating all received shares during all iterations. Since
nh’s in Algorithm 2 are picked independently in each iteration,
the leakage of information for the model in terms of DS metric
is bounded by kηs, where k is the number of iterations and
ηs is characterized in (18) for t “ 1 and in (25) for t ą 1.
Furthermore, the privacy guarantee for the dataset in terms of
the DS metric is given by (18) for t “ 1 and by (25) for t ą 1,
regardless of the value of k since the dataset is encoded and sent
to the servers only once during the protocol. Hence, given all the
1
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Fig. 2: Comparison between the accuracy of our protocol and Cod-
edPrivateML [14] implementations. The number of iterations in both
cases is 15.
parameters in the described experiment, the privacy guarantee
in our protocol in terms of the DS metric is ηs ď 2ˆ 10´14
for the model and ηs ď 10´15 for the dataset. These hold by
utilizing (18), where σn “ 1018 is picked, and setting l ď 20 in
all experiments while noting that the maximum absolute value
of data is r “ 255 in MNIST dataset.
In the second experiment, the accuracy of a fixed-point
(FXP) implementation, according to the protocol proposed in
CodedPrivateML [14], is simulated in a similar scenario with
N “ 4 and t “ 1, and is compared with that of our protocol. All
other parameter are picked according to what is reported in [14],
which also uses 64 bits to represent elements of the finite field.
Figure 2 demonstrates that the accuracy of CodedPrivateML
(fixed point) is significantly dropped to around 0.5, equivalent
to that of a random guessing, when the size of dataset exceeds
100. Note that the original train and test datasets consist of
12396 and 2038 samples, respectively. In order to observe the
performance with small dataset sizes, we pick a dataset with
equal data points labeled with 3 and 7 in each experiment. Also,
we run the experiment 1000 times by picking different sets of
samples and the average accuracy is reported in Figure 2 .
This comparison demonstrates the superiority of our pro-
posed protocol in the analog domain and implemented using
floating point numbers comparing to the state-of-the-art dis-
tributed computing and learning schemes employing quanti-
zation followed by computations over a finite field. In other
words, our protocol is robust with respect to the size of the
training dataset while the fixed-point implementations suffer
significantly from wrap-around error as the size of dataset
passes a certain threshold depending on the prime number
picked as the size of underlying finite field.
One major advantage of CodedPrivateML over MPC-based
approaches is that it provides an order of magnitude speed
up, based on the experiment results reported in [14]. The
reason is that in CodedPrivateML, there is no communication
between computation parties thereby improving the communi-
cation complexity of the scheme significantly, compared with
the state-of-the-art cryptographic approaches. This advantage
9Dataset size CodedPrivateML Our Protocol
1000 0.72 0.25
2000 1.49 0.52
3000 2.49 0.80
4000 3.87 1.09
5000 5.94 1.38
TABLE II: Comparison of the run times between the fixed-point and
the floating-point implementations. The times are reported in seconds.
The experiments are done on a Macbook pro with 3.5 GHz dual-core
intel core i7 CPU and 16 GB memory.
is preserved in our protocol as well, since no communication is
needed between the parties.
Note that in order to avoid the wrap-around error in the fixed-
point implementation each computation party should stop the
computation before the the wrap-around threshold is passed
and divide the computation task into smaller subtasks. Then,
it needs to send back all the computation results associated
to each subtask to the master node in order to guarantee
recovery of the computation result. This results in an excess
communication and computation overhead compared with our
protocol. Moreover, since the threshold is not known a priori,
one always needs to check if the wrap-around is occurred
during the computation process. These factors slow down Cod-
edPrivateML when the dataset is large and one wants to avoid
the errors due to wrap-around. In Table II, the computation
times of CodedPrivateML and our protocol are compared for
the experiment discussed in this section for different dataset
sizes, while discarding the delay in CodedPrivateML due to
frequently checking wrap-around errors and communication
overhead. It shows that for the same level of accuracy of the
results, our approach with the floating-point implementation
also outperforms the fixed-point implementations while pre-
serving the speed up advantage compared with the MPC-based
schemes.
VI. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSIONS
In this paper, we tackled the critical problem of privacy-
preserving computation over a real-valued dataset using dis-
tributed honest-but-curious servers. To this end, we proposed
a protocol that utilizes a counterpart of Shamir’s secret sharing
scheme in the analog domain. In order to measure the privacy
level of the data, the conventional notion of distinguishing
security is extended to the analog domain and privacy guar-
anties for the proposed scheme are characterized based on
this security metric. The well-known connection between the
DS and the MIS measures of security is extended from the
discrete domain to the continues domain. This is then utilized
to bound the DS metric of our protocol using well-known
results on the capacity of SIMO channel with correlated noise.
Furthermore, the accuracy of the outcome of the computation is
characterized assuming a floating-point implementation of the
protocol. In our experiments, we illustrated that the accuracy
of the predictions for the logistic regression model over the
MNIST dataset derived by our protocol closely follows that of
the conventional centralized approach. Finally, we showed that
our protocol is robust with respect to the size of the training
dataset, i.e., there is almost no accuracy loss as the size of the
training dataset grows large, while the performance of the fixed-
point implementations in prior work significantly diminishes
due to overflow errors.
There are several directions for future work. Extending the
proposed protocol in this paper to scenarios with straggler
servers is an interesting direction for future research. More
specifically, in our protocol it is assumed that all the servers
successfully finish their assigned tasks, while a certain number
of servers, referred to as stragglers, may be slow or may not
respond at all in practice [36]–[41]. The main challenge in
this direction is to pick the parameters of the protocol and to
design the decoder that is better than the naive and numerically
unstable approach of solving a system of linear equations in
the analog domain. Another direction is to adopt the pro-
posed protocol in this paper to perform computational tasks in
distributed fashion for other applications, such as distributed
optimization and mechanism design [42]–[46], while keeping
the data private. Generalizing Algorithm 1 in order to simul-
taneously compute multiple evaluations of a polynomial in a
single-shot is another future direction. To this end, techniques
for multi-user secret sharing can be utilized [47]. Obtaining
such results can potentially lead to privacy-preserving multi-
task learning protocols, i.e., protocols that train multiple models
over a dataset in a single round.
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